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ABSTRACT
This thesis is a reflection upon and evaluation of Nietzsche‘s conception of language as
presented in his early and posthumously published essay On Truth and Lying in an ExtraMoral Sense. I take Nietzsche in On Truth and Lying to be launching a full scale attack
on traditional accounts of language and truth. He counters such conceptions by
presenting what he takes to be the ―forgotten‖ origin of language, which he presents as
consisting of a threefold process of metaphor formation. This conception of the origin of
language is rather technical and, as I will try to show, is doing quite a lot of work for
Nietzsche, not only in his criticisms of other philosophies of language, but also in much
of his later writings.
What becomes manifest throughout this analysis of Nietzsche‘s writings is a form
of linguistic skepticism; however, I will try to show that Nietzsche‘s conception of the
origin of language is not bereft of its own metaphysical assumptions. I will try to show
that his conception of the origin of language is a variation upon an already prevalent
philosophical conception of language, one that presupposes a certain metaphysical gap
between language and reality; thus, Nietzsche‘s continuous criticisms of the failure of
language are due, not to surveying language at work and finding it wanting, but rather to
already having something very similar to what I will call an imagistic conception of
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language. I will then introduce Wittgenstein (particularly his discussion of pain) to show
that what manifests itself in Nietzsche‘s account of language as a threefold process of
metaphor formation is that Nietzsche is only thinking of our relation to reality upon what
I will call a spectator-spectacle model. Only by generalizing the application of this
model to characterize our dealings in and with the world does there seem to be a gap
between language and reality. I will then show that Wittgenstein does a great deal to
reduce the force of this model and thereby revealing Nietzsche‘s pronouncements on the
failure of language to capture the becoming that is life to be unfounded.

Lee, John David, 2010, UMSL, p. 5

INTRODUCTION
In his essay On Truth and Lying in an Extra-Moral Sense1 Nietzsche boldly defines truth
as ―a mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, anthropomorphisms, in short, a sum of
human relations which were poetically and rhetorically heightened, transferred, and
adorned, and after long use seem solid, canonical, and binding to a nation‖ (UWL, p.
250). For many, especially those who have contemplated truth, or gone so far as to take
up the arduous task of theorizing about it, this definition would seem to be putting the
cart before the horse. Indeed, most would declare that metaphors, metonyms,
anthropomorphisms etc. are only possible by virtue of a pre-existing and fixed literal
meaning of our words upon which the metaphoric is parasitic. Of course, what is to be
counted among this pre-existing and fixed lot of the literal may be disputed, but certainly
most would not, as Nietzsche does, say that propositions such as ―The stone is hard‖
(UWL, p. 248), or claims pertaining to trees, colors, snow, and flowers are all metaphors
(UWL, p. 249). For sure, they may be false or spoken with the intent to deceive, but
metaphors?!2 If Nietzsche is correct in his account of language and truth then what has

1

All references to ‗On Truth and Lying in an Extra-Moral Sense‘ are from a collection of Nietzsche‘s
lectures and unpublished writings on language and rhetoric entitled Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and
Language, ed. & trans. Gilman, Blair and Parent (Oxford University Press), 1989. Hereafter referred to as
UWL, and indicating page numbers in parentheses in the text.
2
None of the preceding sentences are meant to be critical of (and even less derogatory towards)
Nietzsche‘s definition, it is just to point out and stress how radically removed it is from traditional (and
most contemporary) conceptions of truth.
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humanity overlooked3 that has led her to think she can speak with any certainty and
authority about reality and her relation to it? Or perhaps the more pointed question
(because it is pointed at Nietzsche rather than humanity) would be this: If Nietzsche is
correct in his conception of truth how can he speak with any certainty and authority about
how things are? That is, if he is correct are not his claims about truth amounting to
nothing more than a mobile army of metaphors etc. just that, metaphors? And if so, then
how can they be correct or true? How are we supposed to understand this paradoxical
account of truth and language?
I will begin by trying to provide a perspicuous account of Nietzsche‘s conception
of truth and language as presented in On Truth and Lying in an Extra-Moral Sense.
Language is not only something over which Nietzsche had an almost unparalleled
command, but, like the rhapsode Ion in Plato‘s Ion - who could both speak Homer
beautifully and ―speak more finely than anyone else about Homer‖4 - Nietzsche has some
very interesting and provocative things to say about language and truth, and in this early
and posthumously published essay are some of Nietzsche‘s most sustained (even if not
the most clear) pronouncements of his conception of them both. So it is well worth
coming to terms with On Truth and Lying even if only for the purposes of getting a
clearer understanding of Nietzsche‘s progression as a writer in general and as a
philosopher in particular.

3

Or as Nietzsche says, ‗forgotten‘.
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I take Nietzsche in On Truth and Lying to be launching a full scale attack on
traditional accounts of language and truth. Indeed, because he considers our language to
be founded upon an illusory metaphysics of essence he sees not only traditional accounts
of language, but the very language that we speak, as being a misconstruing of our relation
to reality and the role that language plays in that relation. He counters this by presenting
what he takes to be the ―forgotten‖ origin of language, which he presents as consisting of
a threefold process of metaphor formation. According to this account, far from being
representations of reality, our words are creatively formed metaphors. This conception of
the origin of language as a process of metaphor formation is rather technical and, as I will
try to show, is doing quite a lot of work for Nietzsche, not only in his criticisms of other
philosophies of language, but also in much of his later writings. That is, I see much of
Nietzsche‘s conception of language as presented in On Truth and Lying as playing a
major role in his continuous pronouncements that reality - which is a reality of
―becoming‖, of ―flux‖ - is only falsified when attempted to be captured by language - a
language of ―being‖, of ―fixity‖. Indeed, I highlight that this very important (and very
Nietzschean) theme is already present in On Truth and Lying in his comparison of
language - our ―edifice of concepts‖ - to Roman Columbaria.
What becomes manifest throughout this analysis of Nietzsche‘s writings is a form
of linguistic skepticism which stems from his account of the origin of language as a

4

Plato, Ion. Translated by W.R.M Lamb. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (Plato, vol. 8 of the
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process of metaphor formation. However, I will try to show that Nietzsche‘s conception
of the origin of language is not bereft of its own metaphysical assumptions. I will try to
show that his conception of the origin of language is a variation upon an already
prevalent philosophical conception of language, one that presupposes a certain
metaphysical gap between language and reality; thus, Nietzsche‘s continuous criticisms
of the failure of language are due, not to surveying language at work and finding it
wanting, but rather to already having something very similar to what I will call an
imagistic conception of language. I will then introduce Wittgenstein (particularly his
discussion of pain) to show that what manifests itself in Nietzsche‘s account of language
as a threefold process of metaphor formation is that Nietzsche is only thinking of our
relation to reality upon what I will call a spectator-spectacle model. Only by generalizing
the application of this model to characterize our dealings in and with the world does there
seem to be a gap between language and reality. I will then show that Wittgenstein does a
great deal to reduce the force of this model and thereby revealing Nietzsche‘s
pronouncements on the failure of language to capture the becoming that is life to be
unfounded.

I. Nietzsche’s Nemeses: The “Forgetful” Philosophers and the Scientistic Minded
From the very first sentence of On Truth and Lying one is instantly aware of the

Loeb Classical Library, ed. G.P. Goold, 1990), (530 b-e, my italics).
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unorthodox and unabashedly mocking attitude towards the much lauded and valorized
quest (or as Nietzsche calls it ―drive‖ or ―will‖) for knowledge and truth: ―In some
remote corner of the universe that is poured out in countless flickering solar systems,
there once was a star on which clever animals invented knowledge‖ (UWL, p. 246).
However, what is most striking about this opening passage is not the mocking tone, nor is
it that those who participate in this supposed quest for knowledge are portrayed as
nothing more than ―clever‖ beasts. What is by far the most striking and most unorthodox
is that they are portrayed as inventors rather than as discoverers. As one of the most
predominant views of truth would have it, truth is precisely that which is not invented;
truth, they would say, is that which simply is, universally, immutably and independently
of us. In Book X of Plato‘s Republic Socrates expresses this very notion of truth when he
says: ―There turn out, then, to be these three kinds of couches: one that is in nature, which
we would say, I suppose, a god produced…And then one that the carpenter
produced…and one that the painter produced‖5, and all those who were present agreed.
The true couch is the one whose form is contained in nature and is sought after and
imitated by the carpenter. We might also see the carpenter as analogous to what
Nietzsche calls the ―concept-former‖, where, for example, the concept ―couch‖ is
correctly formed (and used) by its correspondence with the form which is found in

5

Plato, Republic, Trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1991). 597b (Bloom‘s italics). I should
point out that I think it is a serious and open question as to whether Socrates‘ expression of this notion of
truth is synonymous with his adherence to or profession of this notion (let alone Plato‘s). For a very cogent
and ‗fine‘ reading along these lines of Plato in general and the Republic in particular, see Fendt and
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nature. The painter or, more generally, the artist, is then an imitator of the first and more
accurate imitation, which only further removes the artist from the actual truth. Upon this
notion of truth any artistic creation is dependent, not only on the form which is embedded
in nature, but also upon the correct and literal imitation of the form by the
carpenter/concept-former.
Perhaps a more recent rendition of this notion of truth - of course with its own
variations - is the positivistic idea that truth obtains when our language conforms to or
mirrors the world in some determinate way. This conception of truth plays a large role in
much of early analytic philosophy and I am thinking particularly of its presentation in
Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus, in which he sets out to draw a limit
between the world and everything else6 –―The world is all that is the case‖7 – and the
limit has been drawn in language –―The world is the totality of facts, not of things‖ (TLP,
1.2). In language the limit is drawn between propositions describing possible ―states of
affairs‖ (i.e. possible ―combinations of objects‖), and all other language. When a

Rozema (1998).
6
Of course, the author of the Tractatus (and the positivists that follow his lead) ardently consider the world
to be all that is the case, so I admit it is a bit odd to say that a limit is being drawn between the world (all
there is) and…well, what are we to say here? What is interesting about the Tractatus is that logic, along
with religion, ethics and aesthetics, are ―transcendental‖, that is, outside all that is the case (TLP, 6.13 and
6.421), outside that which can be said. Thus, as odd as it may sound, the Tractatus itself falls outside all
that is the case (i.e. the world). Hence the reason that the Tractatus ends in silence - ―What we cannot
speak about we must pass over in silence‖ (TLP, 7). So, when I say that in the Tractatus a limit is being
drawn between the world and everything else, that which falls into the category of ‗everything else‘ is to be
passed over in silence; it might be said: everything works just as well as nothing about which nothing can
be said.
7
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness (London
and New York: Routledge Classics, 2004), p. 5. Further references to the Tractatus will be given in the
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proposition describes an actual state of affairs, an actual combination of objects in the
world, that proposition is true. A true proposition is a fact and ―the facts in logical space
are the world‖ (TLP, 1.13) Thus, the limit that is drawn between the world and
everything else8 can be seen in language between the propositions asserting possible and
actual states of affairs in logical space and everything outside of this space respectively.
And the limit, claims the author of the Tractatus, must be drawn in language for it is only
in language that that which allows for the possibility of saying something true about the
world (i.e. ―logical form‖) can be shown - that it is only in language that ―logical form‖
can be shown marks an important distinction here from a Platonic or Essentialist
conception of truth. For upon the Tractarian conception of truth, ―logical form‖ is not
something else added on, not some other thing (such as a Platonic form or embedded
Essence); rather, it is the form of the very objects themselves (and the form of the
thoughts and descriptions of such objects). One of the examples the author of the
Tractatus gives to illustrate this point is of the links of a chain (TLP, 2.03). There is
nothing other than the links themselves and the form that they take that constitutes their
connection: ―Propositions can represent the whole of reality, but they cannot represent
what they must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it--logical
form…What finds its reflection in language, language cannot represent‖ (TLP, 4.12-1).
So upon the Socratic view there is a form that is imitated or mirrored by the

text as TLP following the numbered divisions made by Wittgenstein.
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carpenter/concept-former and when this is done correctly the upshot is truth. In the
Tractarian view there is an isomorphism that obtains when a thought and its expression
in a proposition share the same logical form as that of the world or reality, and the upshot
of this isomorphism is a true thought and proposition. In both cases there is a universal,
immutable and independent form that is embedded in or informs reality to which our
concepts conform, and this conformation is truth.
Only due to a certain form of selective ―forgetfulness‖, says Nietzsche, could such
views of truth and language be formulated. He also contends that there is a certain charm
- along with a sense of security without which communal life would be rendered
intolerable9 - that these views have that makes this forgetfulness all the more possible and
alluring. But what is it that these philosophers are failing to remember and how is such
forgetfulness made so easy? In On Truth and Lying Nietzsche provides what he takes to
be a philological (or genealogical) account of how such conceptions of truth and
language have come about and have remained so pervasive, and it is to this account that I
shall now turn.

II. Philosophy as Philology: Nietzsche’s Unveiling of Truth’s Forgotten Origins
I had mentioned above that Nietzsche had an undeniable mastery of language, whether it
be Greek, Latin, French or his native German tongue. This mastery, of course, owes

8

See footnote 6.
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much to Nietzsche‘s philological background and I mention this background here for two
reasons. The first is that, in order to show that the philosophical accounts of truth and
language discussed above have drastically erred, Nietzsche resorts to a method of
genealogical excavation utilizing techniques such as those in etymological and
philological approaches to the study of languages. The second reason is that the imagery
that Nietzsche uses to describe the origins of language, the ―drive for truth‖ and the
relationship between knower and that which is known (or if this is different, truth-seeker
and the truth) is laden with the language of literary and linguistic analysis; that is, in
order to describe man‘s relation to reality and man‘s assessment of that relation, notions
such as ―interpretation‖, ―translation‖, ―concept-formation‖ and, of course, ―metaphor‖
are always more prominent than the language of ―correspondence‖ or ―representation‖.
As Daniel Breazeale puts it: ―When he examined actual cases of knowledge, Nietzsche
concluded that the process involved in bridging the gap between subject and object bears
a much closer resemblance to the process of metaphor formation than to any kind of
‗picturing‘ or ‗mirroring‘.‖ 10
As said in the introduction almost every attempt to give an account of the role that
metaphor plays in language presupposes a fixed, literal meaning of our words, upon
which the metaphorical is taken to be parasitic. That is, the fixed, literal meaning is
always considered to be logically (conceptually) prior to any metaphorical use of

9

More on this below. Cf. pp. 9-11.
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language. Nietzsche, however, views this as fundamentally flawed, precisely because
what is here taken to be fundamental – i.e. the fixed, literal meaning which is considered
to be the privileged position at which language and reality come into direct contact – is an
illusion. What is forgotten, then, according to Nietzsche, is that what is fundamental to
language is not a disinterested formation of concepts - disinterested attempts to get
language, thought and reality to correlate, one with the other, a la the Tractarian logicophilosopher - but rather, an active, indeed creative formation of metaphors.
Nietzsche presents this fundamental process of metaphor formation as threefold
and it begins at the same level as most explanations of concept formation, i.e. at
perception. Man, says Nietzsche, ―designates only the relations of things to men, and to
express these relations he uses the boldest of metaphors. First, he translates a nerve
stimulus into an image! That is the first metaphor. Then, the image must be reshaped
into a sound! The second metaphor. And each time there is a complete overleaping of
spheres—from one sphere to the center of a totally different, new one‖ (UWL p. 248-9).
The first metaphor formation, as far as I can tell, takes place purely at the physiological
level. There is a transition – or to keep in line with the etymology of the word
―metaphor‖, a ―carrying over‖11 – of the stimulations that are received in the sphere of the
nerve stimuli into the sphere in which the image is formulated (presumably the sphere of

10

Daniel Breazeale, ‗Introduction‘, in Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the
early 1870’s, (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1979), xxxiii.
11
Ibid. Breazeale gives the etymology of the Greek word ―metaphor‖ as ―to carry over,‖ ―to carry across,‖
or ―to transfer‖.
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the imagination).
I will be returning to this point in section V below, but right now I will just say
that it is unclear just how to take this first metaphor formation, in the sense that it is
unclear what active role the human being plays in this kind of nerve stimulation, let alone
the active role of ―translator.‖ Nevertheless, this seems to be how Nietzsche is
conceiving it, and the main point and this juncture is that the physiological sphere in
which the nerve stimulus takes place and the sphere in which the image takes place are
utterly distinct, and any translation that takes place could only be a metaphorical rather
than a literal one. And in much the same vein the second metaphor formation takes place
when a sound is voiced which designates the image which was translated from the nerve
stimulus: ―What is a word? The portrayal of nerve stimuli in sounds‖ (UWL, p. 248).
There is a third and final metaphor formation and it is when the ―word as sound‖
– which is a metaphor for the image, which, in turn, is a metaphor for the nerve stimulus
– becomes a concept:
Every word instantly becomes a concept precisely insofar as it is not
supposed to serve as a reminder of the unique and entirely individual
original experience to which it owes its origin; but rather, a word becomes
a concept insofar as it simultaneously has to fit countless more or less
similar cases—which means, purely and simply, cases which are never
equal and thus altogether unequal. Every concept arises from the equation
of the unequal things (UWL, p. 249).
Whereas the ―word as sound‖ is meant to portray only the ―unique and entirely
individual‖ image, which is an image of the ―unique and entirely individual‖ nerve

Lee, John David, 2010, UMSL, p. 16

stimulus, the concept is meant to portray or ―pick out‖ that which is similar in all the
individual instances, disregarding the dissimilar. It is precisely this ―picking out‖ of that
which the individual experiences supposedly have in common that is traditionally taken
to be the ―literal‖ interpretation of those experiences. Or rather, traditionally they are
taken not to be interpretations at all, but rather as instances in which a concept comes
into direct contact with reality. However, if we grant that Nietzsche‘s story of the origin
of language as a continuous process of metaphor formations is correct, then the very
activity of concept formation only takes place after a significant amount of interpretive
work has transpired. So to claim that the concept is in direct contact with reality – which,
on Nietzsche‘s schema, the closest thing to direct contact with reality would be the nerve
stimulus, from which the concept is the furthest removed – would either be a mistake, an
illusion or a lie. Ironically, if we accept Nietzsche‘s portrayal (N), and compare his
schema of concept formation with that given by Socrates(S):
(N): Nerve stimulus (translation) image (translation) word (translation) concept,
(S): Form (imitation) couch/concept (imitation) artwork,
then those who claim to be speaking the truth according to Nietzsche (i.e. the
philosophers and the scientists), are in the same position in relation to the truth as are the
artists according to Socrates,12 that is, as far removed from truth as one could possibly be!

12

There is, of course, an undeniable resemblance between Nietzsche‘s portrayal of the distinction between
the artist and the philosophers and scientists in On Truth and Lying and the distinction between the
Dionysian and the Apollonian in The Birth of Tragedy respectively. Below I will attempt to show the
connection between On Truth and Lying and Nietzsche‘s later writings, but I will remain relatively silent
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And it is precisely that the philosophers and scientists do so resemble the artist which
Nietzsche says they have forgotten:
Only by forgetting this primitive world of metaphor can one live with any
repose, security, and consistency: only by means of the purification and
coagulation of a mass of images which originally streamed from the
primal faculty of human imagination like a fiery liquid, only in the
invincible faith that this sun, this window, this table is a truth in itself, in
short, only by forgetting that he himself is an artistically creating subject,
does man live with any repose, security, and consistency (UWL, p. 252,
emphasis in the original).
According to Nietzsche, the philosophers and the scientists have become so
entranced by the similarities between the ―unique and entirely individual experiences‖
that they have forgotten that they are dealing with a similarity and are under the illusion
that they‘re dealing with an equality. Under such an illusion one ―now places his
behavior under the control of abstractions. He will no longer tolerate being carried away
by sudden impressions, by intuitions…he universalizes all these impressions into less
colorful, cooler concepts, so that he can entrust the guidance of his life and conduct to
them. Everything which distinguishes man from the animals depends upon this ability to
volatilize perceptual metaphors in a schema, and thus to dissolve an image into a
concept‖ (UWL, p. 250).
This forgetful creation of a conceptual schema is, according to Nietzsche, one of
man‘s greatest blunders, and yet, it seems to have been inevitable. On the one hand, man
as ―rational being‖ has erected concepts which are to capture the form which is itself

concerning The Birth of Tragedy.
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supposed to be embedded in the ―unique and entirely individual experiences,‖ but these
individual experiences are themselves the metaphorical constructs of the artistically
creative individual for whom they are experiences: ―But in any case it seems to me that
‗the correct perception‘—which would mean ‗the adequate expression of an object in the
subject‘—is a contradictory impossibility. For between two absolutely different spheres,
as between subject and object, there is no causality, no correctness‖ (UWL, p. 252).
There is no ―correctness‖ because the subject is utterly distinct from the object, and in
being utterly distinct any description of the object by the subject would require a
metaphor formation, a ―carrying over‖ from one sphere into an entirely distinct other.
That is, any account of ―correctness‖ will always already be wrapped up in the process of
concept (i.e. metaphor) formation. One might think here that if man could only step
outside himself and get, say, a bird‘s eye-view, then he might be able to speak of the
―correct perception.‖ But this would only be another illusion, and it is precisely why
Nietzsche considers the notion of a ―correct perception‖ to be a contradictory
impossibility rather than simply an impossibility, for apart from the impossibility of
man‘s stepping outside himself to get a bird‗s eye-view (whatever this might be), should
he do so, he would see that the bird‘s eye-view is just that, the bird’s perception. Apart
from the value-schema that man has created (and forgotten that he has done so), all
perceptions are of equal value, and, therefore, no value, and should man step outside
himself, he would be stepping outside the realm of this schema: ―if each of us had a
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different kind of sense perception—if we could only perceive things now as a bird, now
as a worm, now as a plant, or if one of us saw a stimulus as red, another as blue, while a
third even heard the same stimulus as a sound—then no one would speak of such a
regularity of nature, rather, nature would be grasped only as a creation which is
subjective in the highest degree‖ (UWL, p. 253).
On the other hand, this is precisely why Nietzsche considers the edifice of
concepts an inevitable human creation, for if mankind did not erect such a schema, life,
he maintains, would be altogether intolerable:
…something is possible in the realm of these schemata which could never
be achieved with the vivid first impressions: the construction of a
pyramidal order according to castes and degrees, the creation of a new
world of laws, privileges, subordinations, and clearly marked
boundaries—a new world, one which now confronts that other vivid world
of first impressions as more solid, more universal, better known, and more
human than the immediately perceived world, and thus as the regulative
and imperative world (UWL, p. 250).
It is, Nietzsche thinks, largely due to the pleasant, life-preserving consequences for which
the edifice of concepts allows that mankind is eager, all-too-eager, to forget its origins
(UWL, p. 248). In forgetting the origin of language our linguistic practices are seen as
comprising a fixed whole for which the edifice of concepts is to provide a justification, a
foundation. However, Nietzsche says, ―if but for an instant he could escape from the
prison walls of this faith, his ‗self-consciousness‘ would be immediately destroyed‖
(UWL, p. 252). That is, should one view his concepts, not as mirroring or corresponding
to reality or some form embedded therein, but as sharing nothing more than an ―aesthetic
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relation‖ (ibid.), he would immediately want to step outside of his skin, for he would at
once be utterly dissatisfied with his linguistic practices in particular and his life in
general, precisely because they depend on him, for they are of his making.
So, in On Truth and Lying, Nietzsche presents a contrasting story of the origin of
language, one in which language is the end result of a process of metaphor formations.
This process shows language to be far removed from the reality it purportedly represents,
not by distance per se, but by being a metaphor for a metaphor of a nerve-stimulus. In
forgetting this origin man performs yet another metaphor formation, when the ―word as
sound‖ (the second metaphor) is taken to ―pick out‖ the common element, that which is
supposedly common to each ―unique and entirely individual experience‖; such
abstractions become concretized as the ―edifice of concepts‖, a schema by which one
conducts and lives one‘s life. It is this illusion of stability that allows for the tolerability
of life as such.

III. Interpolation: From First to Last
I take the above to be Nietzsche‘s conception of language and truth as presented in On
Truth and Lying in an Extra-Moral Sense. This posthumously published essay was
written in 1873 when Nietzsche was still a professor of classical philology at the
University of Basel, and just a year after the publication of his first book The Birth of
Tragedy. It would be interesting, then, to see just how much (if at all) Nietzsche‘s views
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on these issues evolved throughout his short but extremely prolific authorship which
spanned just sixteen years, from 1872-1888.
Perhaps now is the time to say that I think there is good reason to believe that
much of Nietzsche‘s subsequent writings are informed by and often expand and elaborate
upon just this conception of language and truth. For instance, in part two of Beyond
Good and Evil (―The Free-Spirit‖) we hear Nietzsche mocking the ―simplification and
falsification‖ that is man: ―…how from the beginning we have contrived to retain our
ignorance in order to enjoy an almost inconceivable freedom, lack of scruple and caution,
heartiness, and gaiety of life - in order to enjoy life! And only on this now solid, granite
foundation of ignorance could knowledge rise so far‖ (BGE, sec. 24). Language,
Nietzsche goes on, remains awkward and continues to ―talk of opposites where there are
only degrees and many subtleties of gradation‖ (ibid.).13 As in On Truth and Lying, talk
of opposites (e.g. truth and falsity) is presented as a created means by which life is made
tolerable.
Around the same time as the publication of Beyond Good and Evil14 we have
Nietzsche writing in his notebooks: ―Against the positivism which halts at phenomena
[which claims] ‗There are only facts‘ - I would say: no, facts are just what there aren‘t,

13

See also section 34 and especially 268 of the same text, the latter of which beginning with a
recapitulation of the process of concept formation found in On Truth and Lying: ―What, in the end, is
common? Words are acoustical signs for concepts; concepts, however, are more or less definite image
signs for often recurring and associated sensations, for groups of sensations…‖.
14
Around 1886.
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there are only interpretations‖ (LNB, p. 139).15 Implicit in this denial of facts is
Nietzsche‘s conception of language as a process of metaphor formation. He is not
denying that when people speak of facts they mean what they say, rather, he is denying
that facts have any special status over and above interpretations, for as we have already
seen, in order for there to be talk of facts, a significant amount of interpretation has
already gone on. Perhaps the force of this conception of language and truth reaches its
pinnacle when Nietzsche says that the world so ardently and solemnly contemplated by
the philosophers and the scientists is ―false, i.e., is not a fact but a fictional elaboration
and filling out of a meager store of observations; it is ‗in flux‘, as something becoming,
as a constantly shifting falsity that never gets any nearer to truth, for - there is no ‗truth‘‖
(LNB, p. 80). By calling the world ―false‖ Nietzsche is denying the world as it is
conceived of according to the edifice of concepts, that according to which truth and
falsity are determined. That is, if the ―true‖ world is the one characterized by the
concretized edifice of concepts (i.e. our language), well, then, says Nietzsche, the world
is not that. What, then, is the world? Entirely other than the world according to our
static, fixed language, that is, in flux, ―false‖.
This notion that the world is one of ―flux‖ or becoming (as opposed to being)
plays an important role in Nietzsche‘s philosophy in general and in On Truth and Lying
in particular, for our willingness to assume that language can capture the flux or

15

Further references to Writings from the Late Notebooks, R. Bittner ed., K. Sturge, trans. (Cambridge:

Lee, John David, 2010, UMSL, p. 23

becoming of reality is a willingness that Nietzsche is incessantly trying to expose as
groundless. Because language is a fixed schema founded upon, or informed by, a
metaphysics of essence, any attempt to portray the flux of life by means of language is
always already a transference of fluctuation to fixity. I will try to explain this.
In On Truth and Lying Nietzsche illustrates this failure of language to capture or
represent the becoming of reality by comparing language - our ―edifice of concepts‖ - to
Roman Columbaria: ―Whereas any intuitive metaphor is individual and unique and
therefore always eludes any commentary, the great structure of concepts displays the
rigid regularity of a Roman columbarium…in this respect man can probably be admired
as a mighty architectural genius who succeeds in building an infinitely complicated
conceptual cathedral on foundations that move like flowing water‖ (UWL, p. 251).
Columbaria are elaborate storage places for cinerary urns containing the remains of
venerated members of the community. The architecture of these columbaria is meant to
invoke awe and reverence for the deceased. However, what is contained within the
columbaria - and by analogy the ―edifice of concepts‖ - is nothing but ashes, nothing but
the remains of what once was living, breathing, becoming.
That becoming cannot be captured in language is a theme that runs through
Nietzsche‘s writings from first to last. In the summer of 1885, some twelve years after
composing On Truth and Lying, Nietzsche records in his notebooks a criticism of

Cambridge University Press, 2003) will be indicated in the text by LNB in parentheses followed by the

Lee, John David, 2010, UMSL, p. 24

philosophy virtually identical to that found in his early essay: ―Philosophy in the only
way I still allow it to stand…as an attempt somehow to describe Heraclitean becoming
and to abbreviate it into signs (so to speak, to translate and mummify it into a kind of
illusory being)‖ (LNB, p. 26).16 In On the Genealogy of Morals, published in 1887,
Nietzsche says that ―there is no ‗being‘ behind doing, effecting, becoming; ‗the doer‘ is
merely a fiction added to the deed - the deed is everything‖ (GM: First Essay, Section
13).17 And in Twilight of the Idols, completed in September of 1888, just three months
before his mental breakdown in Turin (January 3, 1889), Nietzsche reiterates in aphoristic
form his charge in On Truth and Lying directed against the philosophers and scientists:
―All that philosophers have handled for thousands of years have been concept-mummies;
nothing real escaped their grasp alive. When these honorable idolaters [sic] of concepts
worship something, they kill it and stuff it; they threaten the life of everything they
worship. Death, change, old age, as well as procreation and growth, are to their minds
objections - even refutations. Whatever has being does not become; whatever becomes
does not have being‖ (TI: ―Reason‖ in Philosophy, Section 1).18 This diametric

page number.
16
A bit later in the notebooks (1887) he writes: ―In fact logic (like geometry and arithmetic) only applies
to fictitious truths that we have created. Logic is the attempt to understand the real world according to a
scheme of being that we have posited, or, more correctly, the attempt to make it formulatable, calculable
for us…‖ (LNB 158, italics in original).
17
All references to On the Genealogy of Morals are taken from Basic Writings of Nietzsche, Walter
Kaufmann, trans. and ed., (New York: Modern Library, 2000).
18
See also section 5 under the same heading of Twilight of the Idols: ―…We enter a realm of crude
fetishism when we summon before consciousness the basic presuppositions of the metaphysics of language,
in plain talk, the presuppositions of reason…I am afraid we are not rid of God because we still have faith in
grammar.‖ All references to Twilight of the Idols are from The Portable Nietzsche, Walter Kaufmann,
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opposition between being and becoming is, in On Truth and Lying, the opposition
between language and reality respectively.
What Nietzsche is calling for, then - what he takes to be the task of the
philosopher of the future19 - is an attempt at getting beyond conceiving of reality in terms
of being, which consists (at least in large part) in getting beyond language as it purports
to represent reality in such terms: ―What‘s needed first is absolute skepticism [sic]
towards all received concepts‖ (LNB, p. 13).
―How‖, it might be asked, ―is one to get beyond?‖ In On Truth and Lying one‘s
striving to get beyond the ―edifice of concepts‖ - that ―regular and rigid new world
[which] is built up for him as a prison fortress20‖ (UWL, p. 254) - takes the form of art
and mythmaking. The artist, says Nietzsche, ―constantly confuses the categories and
cells of the concepts by presenting new transferences, metaphors, and metonyms;
constantly showing the desire to shape the existing world of the wide-awake person to be
variegatedly irregular and disinterestedly incoherent, exciting and eternally new, as is the
world of dreams…That enormous structure of beams and boards of the concepts, to
which the poor man clings for dear life, is for the liberated intellect just a scaffolding and
plaything for his boldest artifices‖ (UWL, p. 254-5). This view of language as a
―plaything‖ of the artist, and of the artist - and more specifically, the poet - as genius, as

trans. and ed. (New York: Viking, 1982).
19
The subtitle to Beyond Good and Evil is ―Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future‖. Getting beyond good
and evil is an aspect of getting beyond language, or at least a language that is founded upon a metaphysics
of essences.
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master-confuse(r) of categories and liberator from hierarchical conceptual schemes has
had a profound impact upon many (post-)modern artists, poets and theorists. However,
my main concern at this juncture is not whether this influence has been for good or ill
(I‘m sure it is a little or a lot of both). Rather, I think it is of the utmost importance to
recognize how self-reflective Nietzsche is about his criticisms of language, its limitations
and his role as author; that is, Nietzsche does not consider himself, his language, to be
exempt from these very criticisms.21 In Twilight of the Idols - amidst his effort of
―sounding out idols‖, that is, revealing commonly held ―ideals‖ to be ―hollow‖22 Nietzsche pauses, as if to remind not only his readers but himself as well that, should
anyone take what he has to say dogmatically, one would only be erecting yet another
hollow idol, another columbarium: ―We no longer esteem ourselves sufficiently when we
communicate ourselves. Our true experiences are not at all garrulous. They could not
communicate themselves even if they tried. That is because they lack the right word.

20

I will return to Nietzsche‘s conception of language as a ―prison fortress‖ below.
In his Deconstruction: Theory and Practice (2002), Christopher Norris concurs when he says
―Nietzsche…permits his reader no such comforting assurance that the ‗truth‘ of his writing is there to be
discovered by a careful passage from signifier to signified. To interpret him thus is to fall once again into
the great Platonic illusion of a realm of purely intelligible meaning obscured by the material artifice of
language‖ (p. 66). However, Norris provides no contextual evidence that Nietzsche is so self-aware of his
un-authoritative authorship. Therefore, I take this paragraph to be an attempt to make good Norris‘ claim
and others like it.
22
In his preface to Twilight of the Idols or, How One Philosophizes with a Hammer, Walter Kaufmann
does a great service in reminding Nietzsche‘s readers that ―philosophizing with a hammer‖ is the art of
hearing the hollowness of the ―idols‖ (i.e. false ideals or false gods) when they are ―touched with a hammer
as with a tuning fork‖ (PN, p. 464). See also Nietzsche‘s preface to Ecce Homo where he says: ―The last
thing I should promise would be to ‗improve‘ mankind. No new idols are erected by me…Overthrowing
idols (my word for ―ideals‖) - that comes closer to being part of my craft‖ (BWN, 673-4). These two selfdescriptions of Nietzsche‘s enterprise could equally well characterize Nietzsche‘s efforts in On Truth and
Lying, where he is revealing ―idols‖ to be hollow as roman columbaria.
21

Lee, John David, 2010, UMSL, p. 27

Whatever we have words for, that we have already got beyond. In all talk there is a grain
of contempt…With language the speaker immediately vulgarizes himself. Out of a
morality for deaf-mutes and other philosophers‖ (TI, p. 530-1).23 In using language to
communicate ourselves and our experiences we are like Gorgons standing upon the bank
of a flowing stream; as soon as we dip our hands in and pull something out we have at
once fossilized it and thereby falsified it. If our goal is to communicate our true selves which are selves of ―becoming‖ - and our true experiences - which, in the terms of On
Truth and Lying, are ―unique and entirely individual‖ - then to do so in a language of
essences, a language of ―being‖ (that is, according to Nietzsche, our language) is always
already a failure to communicate them.

IV. Language as Prison
In the preceding section I have attempted to present textual evidence that shows On Truth
and Lying to be, not just an early, isolated and unsophisticated attempt on Nietzsche‘s
part to criticize and separate himself from his philosophical ancestors. Rather, as I hope
to have shown, in this essay Nietzsche confronts problems and presents major themes that
run through his entire corpus, most importantly: the origin of language as a process of
metaphor formations; the diametric opposition between our language of being and the
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Compare with the last aphorism (sec. 296) of Beyond Good and Evil, just before Nietzsche breaks into
verse: ―What things do we copy, writing and painting…what are the only things we are able to paint? Alas,
always only what is on the verge of withering and losing its fragrance!‖ (BGE, p. 236). The page numbers
refer to The Portable Nietzsche, Walter Kaufmann, trans. and ed. (New York: Viking, 1982).
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becoming of reality and, therefore, the failure of language to capture reality and the call
to get beyond such limitations. Indeed, in his recent analysis of Beyond Good and Evil,
Douglas Burnham concurs when he says that ―this problem of language reiterates
Nietzsche‘s general methodological problem: how to communicate about the world as
will to power when ordinary and even philosophical language is saturated in moral
evaluations that are ultimately falsifications of just that world?‖ (RN, p. 205).24 Burnham
continues by saying that for Nietzsche ―philosophical thought itself is by virtue of its
basic constitution unable to penetrate the depths of existence‖ (RN, p. 224). Unable, that
is, because thought‘s basic constitution is linguistic. Language, as Nietzsche conceives it,
prevents such penetration as prison walls prevent access to the freedom - the becoming that beckons and mocks from beyond them.25
If I am correct in my presentation of Nietzsche, what manifests itself in his
writings is a form of linguistic skepticism which, to borrow the words of Charles Altieri,
conceives of language as ―somehow a separate structuring force with its own contents‖
(Altieri, pp. 1398-9). And as he goes on to say, ―once words and things are seen as
constituting separate, self-enclosed realms, one can only avoid skepticism [sic.] by
24

When he says this Burnham is discussing section 268 of Beyond Good and Evil which begins thus:
―What, in the end, is common? Words are acoustical signs for concepts; concepts, however, are more or
less definite image signs for often recurring and associated sensations, for groups of sensations…‖ (BGE, p.
216). This is virtually the same story as the one told in On Truth and Lying. That is, as late as BGE the
relation between nerve stimulus (here, ―sensation‖), ―image‖ and word, as it is portrayed in On Truth and
Lying, is simply taken for granted. Further references to Burnham Douglas, Reading Nietzsche: An
Analysis of Beyond Good and Evil, (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen‘s University Press, 2007) will
be indicated by RN in parentheses followed by the page number.
25
―Prison walls‖ is, again, one of Nietzsche‘s descriptions of language (UWL, p. 252), not mine.
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positing some metaphysical entity or ‗origin,‘ an absolute mind, a synthetic a priori,
logical simples, or an idea of forms or essences - to explain how the two come together‖
(ibid., p. 1409). Now, Nietzsche‘s criticisms are not simply to the effect that there are no
such metaphysical entities (even though he is quite adamant that there are not). He is
also trying to show that the assumption that, if word and world are to come together,
there must be, and therefore are, such entities is just that, an assumption, an assumption
that Nietzsche finds manifest in the very language that we speak.
It is my contention, however, that Nietzsche‘s conception of the origin of
language - out of which grows his linguistic skepticism - is not bereft of its own
metaphysical assumptions. I will try to show that his conception of the origin of
language is a variation upon an already prevalent philosophical conception of language,
one that assumes a certain metaphysical gap between language and reality. Nietzsche‘s
continuous criticisms of the failure of language are due, not to surveying language at
work and finding it wanting, but rather to already having what I will call an imagistic
conception of language and, I want to say, a skewed one at that. So, I want now to return
to On Truth and Lying26 so as to call that conception of the origin of language into
question.

26

Though if what I have presented in this essay is correct, we have, in a sense, never really left it.
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V. Language as Prison?: The Origin of Nietzsche’s Linguistic Skepticism
In section II above I expressed some reservations concerning the first crossing over of
spheres in Nietzsche‘s description of the tripartite process of metaphor-formations, the
process of translating a nerve-stimulus into an image. I said there that it is not entirely
clear what role the individual is playing in the process of nerve-stimuli being converted
into mental images, and that it is even less clear that this conversion resembles the
process of translation or metaphor formation. Moreover, it is questionable whether
Nietzsche is describing a process that actually takes place, or whether he is betraying an
uncritical inheritance of a certain imagistic philosophical account of visual perception in
particular, and sensation in general.
I will only hint at it here, but there is a significant tradition within the history of
philosophy in which images play an important intermediary role between word and
world.27 In his analysis of Kant‘s distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments J.
Alberto Coffa describes succinctly what I mean by the ―imagistic tradition‖:
On this way of looking at things, the basic semantic notion is that of
―representations‖ (Vorstellungen) construed as ―modifications of the
mind‖ that ―belong to inner sense‖, as mental states designed to represent
something. A long tradition, canonized in the Logique de Port Royal, had
declared ideas or representations the most important subject of logic, since
―we can have knowledge of what is outside us only through the mediation
of ideas in us‖…In Leibniz‘s words, human souls ―percieve what passes
27

For a fuller account of the history of this tradition see Father Garth L. Hallett‘s Language and Truth
(Yale University Press: New Haven and London, 1988), particularly the first two chapters.
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without them by what passes within them‖…indeed, ―the nature of the
monad‖ is ―to represent‖ (The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap, p.
9).
So, for instance, in the Stromata Clement of Alexandria says that ―in language three
things should be distinguished: first of all names, that are essentially symbols of concepts
and, consequently, of objects. Second, concepts, which are images and impressions of
objects…Third, objects, which impress the concepts in our minds.‖28 Here Clement only
discusses names, but the ordering of the relation is identical to that of Nietzsche‘s:
(N): Nerve stimuli - images are metaphors for stimuli - words are metaphors for images,
(C) Objects - concepts are images for objects - names are symbols for concepts.
John Locke presents a similar picture in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
when he says that ―so far as words are of use and signification, so far is there a constant
connection [sic.] between the sound and the idea, and a designation that the one [sound]
stands for the other [idea]; without which application of them, they are nothing but so
much insignificant noise‖ (ECHU, bk. 3, ch. 2, n. 7; my emphasis). It is only by virtue of
our words being in some way ―the signs of those ideas‖29 that intelligible speech is to be
distinguishable from mere insignificant sound.
Now, I am not here making the claim that Nietzsche is, unbeknownst to himself, a
full-fledged member of this imagistic tradition; to do so would require at the very least an
awkward subversion of much of his writings. Another, and perhaps more important,
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reason that I am refraining from securing Nietzsche a place in this tradition is because,
when Nietzsche talks about the relation between nerve-stimuli and images, and, in turn,
the relation between these images and words, he is talking about them, not in terms of
impressions, significations, sense-data or representations per se, but in terms of
metaphors, and this marks an important distinction between Nietzsche and the imagistic
tradition, for in characterizing the entire process as one of metaphor formation, Nietzsche
is characterizing it as an entirely creative process. However, if my above presentation of
Nietzsche has been faithful to his texts, then his characteristically imagistic account of the
origin of language is, perhaps, an inherited variation that has gone unchecked. That is,
Nietzsche is still portraying words as metaphors for images, and it is here that remnants
of the imagistic account may be seen to have been passed on, even if unnoticed. Thus, I
am claiming that Nietzsche assumes (and, as I have shown, reiterates) a picture of our
relation to the world - and the role that language plays in that relation - that presupposes a
gap between language and reality, that this gap is what gives rise to Nietzsche‘s linguistic
skepticism and that this picture bares a striking resemblance to various imagistic theories.
My goal here is not to fill the gap between language and reality (or in Nietzschean
terms, to show that a successful, that is, literal ―carrying over‖ between spheres can be
made); rather, it is to call into question the very notion of a gap, the very notion that in
dealing with reality and language we are dealing with distinct spheres. What is
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interesting is that portraying reality and language as distinct spheres does not seem to be
peculiar to Nietzsche, and this is why I have pointed to certain similarities between
Nietzsche‘s picture of language‘s relation to reality and various imagistic ways of
characterizing that relation. For as can be seen from just the two imagistic examples
above, language is already portrayed as being somewhat removed from reality in being
symbolic of mental images or designations of ideas; that these images and ideas are
images and ideas of reality is something that is simply taken as given. This, I should
make clear, is not meant to give rise to skepticism about whether our images and ideas
are of reality; it is, rather, to call attention to the assumed generality of the role of
language, that all of our words are symbols or designations of (or metaphors for) images
or ideas. Ludwig Wittgenstein, we may recall, devoted a hearty portion of his intellectual
life to disrupting this very notion, that language always functions in one way, always
serves the same purpose.30
One of the things that manifests itself in such generalities, says Wittgenstein, is
that our relation to reality is only thought of upon the model of spectator-and-spectacle,
and that what we are supposed to try to do with language according to this model is
capture, hook up with, map onto, represent that reality.31 Nietzsche‘s conception of the
origin of language as a threefold process of metaphor formations is different only in that
any attempt at capturing, hooking onto, representing, or what have you, is always already
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See Philosophical Investigations, sec. 304.
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a failed attempt. The emphasis that Wittgenstein places on particular practices (his
hankering for the ordinary) is an attempt to displace the general application of this
spectator-and-spectacle model as the characterization of our relation to reality and the
role language plays in that relation.
This displacement is at work in Wittgenstein‘s discussions of the concept of pain:
Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own
case!-- Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a
―beetle‖. No one can look into anyone else‘s box, and everyone says he
knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle.—Here it would be
quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One
might even imagine such a thing constantly changing.—But suppose the
word ―beetle‖ had a use in these people‘s language?—If so it would not be
used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the
language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be
empty.—No, one can ‗divide through‘ by the thing in the box; it cancels
out, whatever it is. That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the
expression of sensation on the model of ‗object and designation‘ the object
drops out of consideration as irrelevant (PI, sec. 293).32
After reading this passage we can imagine someone asking: ―If someone tells me
that he has a beetle in his box, a box that only he can look into, why then can‘t the word
‗beetle‘ be used as a name?‖ I take it that it‘s because, as of yet, he has not provided us
with any information that would allow us to distinguish between the word ―beetle‖ as
being used to refer to something constant, something constantly changing or, quite
frankly, nothing at all. ―But surely,‖ one might retort, ―he is plenty able to provide that
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information for himself.‖ However, it is unclear why he has not made (or, it seems,
cannot make) that information publicly available to us as well. That is, if he cannot
provide us with any information that would allow us to determine that he is using the
word ―beetle‖ to refer to x as opposed to y or vice versa, or nothing as opposed to either x
or y, then, as of yet we have no way of determining that he is in possession of such
information and, therefore, no way of determining that he is, in fact, making such
distinctions. And if he is not making these distinctions, then, clearly he is not using the
word ―beetle‖ as a name. Thus, it follows that those who ―construe the grammar of the
expression of sensation on the model of ‗object and designation‘‖, those who take words
like ―pain‖ to be referring to private, inner experiences of which only they can have
access, have not provided any indication that they are distinguishing between something
constant, something constantly changing or nothing at all, and, therefore, have not
indicated that they are using the word ―pain‖ to refer at all.33
Wittgenstein‘s discussions on how we are to understanding the meaning of the
concept ―pain‖ are an attempt on his part to displace our unreflective application of the
model of spectator-and-spectacle (the model of ―object and designation‖), so that we may
focus our attention on the various ways that we respond to pain and to others in pain,
which, I take it, could not be more different than responding to someone who says he has
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There have, of course been other (and possibly opposing) readings of this difficult passage than the one
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―private language‖ (and some very original commentary) see Stephen Mulhall‘s Wittgenstein’s Private
Language: Grammar, Nonsense and Imagination in ‘Philosophical Investigations, SS. 243-315 (2007).
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something in a box (that is, the concept ―pain‖ only looks like a name for something in a
box to which only the owner has access when we are unreflectively applying the model
of ―object and designation‖).34 It should be noted also that Wittgenstein is not attempting
to reduce pain (and, therefore, our use of the concept ―pain‖) to pain behavior. He is,
however, stressing the important role that is played by behavior expressive of pain in our
understanding of the concept ―pain‖; that is, for instance, that we should not simply take
it as a matter of course that when we are in pain and want to keep this from others, it is
then that we are performing an act of concealment, and, perhaps more importantly, that
this is often very difficult, if not impossible, to do.35
It might not be too far off to characterize Wittgenstein‘s discussion of pain as
providing an alternative genealogy of the concept ―pain‖, one that does not generalize our
relation to the world upon the model of spectator-and-spectacle. Upon this genealogical
account the word ―pain‖ is not something that is meant to represent some object in the
world, but rather is that by which we come to express ourselves within it. This comes out
when Wittgenstein offers one possible answer to the question of how the connection
between name and the thing named is set up. ―This question,‖ he says, ―is the same as:

Hereafter referred to as WPL.
34
To say this in a slightly different way, using a variation on one of Wittgenstein‘s remarks pertaining to
the concept ―soul‖: My attitude towards him is an attitude towards someone in pain. I am not of the
opinion that he has a pain in the way that someone has something in a box. See Philosophical
Investigations, p. 178, part II, sec. iv.
35
I have been unable to locate exactly where I first came across this point about the concealment of pain,
whether it is one that Wittgenstein makes explicitly or whether it is a point drawn out by one of his many
helpful commentators on Wittgenstein‘s discussion of pain (I am thinking particularly here of David
Cockburn, in his Other Human Beings (1990) and his An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind (2001)).
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how does a human being learn the meaning of the names of sensations?--of the word
―pain‖ for example. Here is one possibility: words are connected with the primitive, the
natural, expressions of the sensation and used in their place. A child has hurt himself and
he cries; and then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences.
They teach the child new pain-behavior./ ―So you are saying that the word ‘pain‘ really
means crying?‘--On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does
not describe it (PI, sec. 244). The connection being made here is not between a word and
some internal, non-linguistic entity; rather, verbal expressions of pain are taught
variations of primitive, natural expressions of sensations. Indeed, because the connection
being made is not between a word and some internal, non-linguistic entity, but between
outer natural expressions of sensations and outer, verbal expressions, the connection is
not between inner and outer at all, but, as Stephen Mulhall puts it, between the old and
the new (WPL, p. 29). That is, there is no ―carrying over‖ because there is, as of yet, no
dichotomy of spheres.
So, how does this all connect up with my discussion of Nietzsche? I said above
that Nietzsche‘s account of language as a threefold process of metaphor formation
presupposes a gulf between language and reality and that what manifests itself in this
account is that Nietzsche is only thinking of our relation to reality in terms of a model of
spectator-and-spectacle. I have introduced Wittgenstein‘s discussions of pain in order to

But I would like to make it clear that this point did not find its origin with me.
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show that the general application of this model is simply unwarranted, that it fails to do
justice to the various ways in which we actually do relate to reality and the role that
language plays in those relations. If I am correct, then it is not language that comes up
short, but Nietzsche‘s account of it. Without his assumption that there is a gap between
language and reality it is unclear just how language fails, just how language is unable to
capture the becoming that is life, the flux that is birth-maturation-decrepitude-death.
Indeed, according to Wittgenstein‘s discussions language is an aspect of the flux that is
life. If Nietzsche still claims language to be a vulgarizing of life, then it is entirely
unclear what flux he is claiming language fails to capture, that is, it‘s unclear what
Nietzsche is claiming language can’t do. It then becomes an ever more pressing question
of just which reality is the fiction, ours or Nietzsche‘s.
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